The disappearance of flight MH370 is possibly the greatest mystery in aviation history. A large zone in the Southern Indian Ocean was searched unsuccessfully leaving an open case and an unacceptable situation for the family members. We discuss the scientific difficulties with locating the plane through satellite data and develop an improved analysis using least square curve fitting of analytical non-Euclidean route equations providing robust topologyoptimization with perturbation theory handling satellite movement. We find four independent solutions with the final part of the flight following a great circle. Two are located in stable minima for the error-function, and two unstable ones agree poorly with most data. One stable solution coincides with the Inmarsat-result near the end of the searchzone addendum, but fails to explain additional data. Our best solution leads to an entirely different location agreeing with other data from debris, acoustics and an eyewitness report, providing a clear conclusion where to find the plane.
1. INTRODUCTION. After contact was lost with flight MH370 on the route from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing on March 8, 2014 the only available data concerning its route came from a military radar facility in Malaysia (News, 2017) and a number of handshakes with a satellite from Inmarsat (Ashton et al., 2014) . Radar data tells us that after shutting down transponders and communication systems it made a sharp turn and flew along the border to Thailand, past Penang to the waypoint MEKAR in the Malacca Strait where military radar lost contact (News, 2017) . Then the satellite handshakes restarted after interruption of the satellite unit (SDU), possibly due to a power failure. The handshakes provide accurate time differences and thereby distances to the satellite 3F1 at approximately geostationary location west of the Maldives, represented by so-called Burst Time Offset (BTO) (Ashton et al., 2014) . The sum of the Doppler shifts for the communication loop was also measured and the local Doppler shift from the airplane movement deduced through the Burst Frequency Offset (BFO). Since these represent frequency shifts due to the radial projection of the movement of the plane, measured simultaneously with BTO at roughly one hour intervals after the reboot, and two data points due to attempted phone calls, it is possible to deduce some route information. However, the accuracy of the Doppler shifts (1% of the maximum value) was believed insufficient to determine a precise route.
If the satellite were perfectly geostationary we would have been practically stuck here, since we could only conclude that it reached a certain distance from the last BTO, giving roughly a circle called the 7 th arc after numbering the handshakes. This corresponds to 2662 nmi (nautical mile (nmi) = 1.852 km) along a spherical earth surface from the ground projection of 3F1. This arc is cut around 55% shorter due to the maximum fuel range of the plane but still represents an unsurmountable difficulty to search, particularly when allowing for moderate movement from the last handshake to the end. In other words the plane effectively disappeared. Physically this is easy to understand, since the satellite measurements only provide radial information, but no direction.
Fortunately the satellite is not completely ideal and wanders, predominantly in north-south direction (Ashton et al., 2014) , and the maximum speed and minimum turning radius for the plane also give some guidance. During most of the flight the satellite moved south after reaching its northern extremum roughly an hour after the SDU restarted. This opens the possibility to distinguish between northern and southern flight routes since the perturbation to the relative airplane velocity (for SDU-satellite Doppler shift) has opposite sign for northern and southern routes. For routes going straight north or south this gives a 10% difference. This is ten times the measurement uncertainty for the BFO leaving no doubt routes going straight north are inconsistent with the data, as shown by Ashton (2014) . Routes towards northeast are even worse. However, in north-western direction there is a chance of a route with poor fit and range near the acceptance limit because the east-west satellite movement mixes with the north-south movement relaxing fitting conditions. We initially ignore this type of solution since it is unlikely that any airplane could penetrate radar surveillance by several countries including India and China on a north-western route. Also it would have to fly at relatively low speed along a curved route to fit the data, and thereby be forced to, but at the same time practically unable to, pass the tall mountains in Himalaya. In addition some of the phones belonging to the passengers would likely have been on and left electronic footprints by handshakes with the Chinese network. Finally all debris would have to be planted. Later we develop a simple test to find all remaining solutions and settle the issue rigorously. This leads us to conclude that only one of the solutions is correct, and define a new and dramatically smaller search zone near Christmas Island. This also explains why all searching until now was unsuccessful.
2. ANALYSIS OF SATELLITE DATA. Soon after military radar contact was lost the SDU restarted unexpectedly. After some time without power it was cold, so it rebooted and reheated simultaneously leading to some highly unreliable handshakes (BTO/BFO) due to temperature drift. These points must be discarded. Around 18:28 UTC the measurement quality was improving in agreement with results from previous SDU cold-starts (Holland, 2017) . At 18:40 Malaysia Airlines called the plane via satellite phone. It was not answered but provided a BFO value and defined the starting point for the hourly handshakes. Unfortunately telephone calls give no BTO (Ashton et al., 2014) . Since the airplane had moved from MEKAR so its height, speed and course were no longer known independently from radar data, it is impossible to extract precise knowledge from these two points without making assumptions or having additional knowledge. It is therefore not until the first regular handshake at 19:41 that complete and precise data is available for systematic analysis. At 18:28 there are two qualitative options: A northern or a southern route. The handshake at 18:28 allows for these two solutions to a quadratic equation. Concerning the route after 18:28 the BFO at 18:40 provides some selection among the possibilities but unfortunately the problem is underdetermined and the data too inaccurate to distinguish between north and south. Importantly the rest of the points look like they are located on a straight line with constant speed when considering the BTO values. If one converts the BTO values to distances, R, along the earth surface from the satellite ground projection using equations (3) and (4), these are modelled well by a simple equation describing a straight line on a flat earth with an exclusively transverse speed of v = 800 km/h, starting at t1 (19:41)
where the front factor is R at t1 = 19:41 and the value 0.2457 is the ratio of v and R(t1). This is a strong lead, in particular since the agreement with measured values is good as shown in figure 1 . Furthermore, the BFO values also agree with expectations from such a straight flight, but with less precision, and with the exception of 19:41, which has movement towards the satellite rather than away from it as the rest of the points, compared to zero movement as equation (1) predicts. In fact it is impossible to reconcile the BFO and BTO information at 19:41 without assuming one of the following:
1) The point at 19:41 is not at all on the same straight line as the rest.
2) There is roughly 10-degree heading change between 19:41 and 20:41.
3) The minimum distance to the satellite lies between 19:41 and 20:41. 4) There is a U-turn between 19:41 and 20:41.
We combined BTO and BFO information in a detailed mathematical analysis to gain deeper insight and found the sign-change for the aircraft Doppler-shift of key importance to select the correct option. We eliminate two of the four possibilities by initially considering a flat earth, and improve by a Taylor expansion of the spherical solution. For a flat earth the surface angle towards the satellite ground projection, , is linked to the speed, v, and radius along the earth surface from the ground projection, R, by 
where RJ is the earth radius and v the airplane speed. Using that vꞏcos( ) is proportional to the Doppler shift we plot this relationship in figure 2 against time, t, measured from 19:41 using the BFO values converted to Doppler shifts (Ashton et al., 2014) and the R-values. We find a relatively good linear fit for all the later points but a poor one for 19:41, and moderate deviation for 20:41. By replacing the simplified flat earth version (2), which is only valid for short distances, with a spherical solution derived from equations (7) and (8) and Taylor expanded to second order in the point at 22:41 (the best approximation which is still a straight line, and labelled equation 2A) one finds a nice fit from 20:41 as shown in the same figure. Equation (2) After establishing this overview of possible solutions we perform the detailed analysis of the rest of the data. The analytical connection between the satellite position, the BTO value and the radius, R, along the earth surface from the satellite ground projection to the airplane is given by Ashton (2014) and Steel (2016) 
where Rsat is the line-of-sight distance from the satellite to the airplane, RJ = 6378 km is the earth radius, H is the satellite height above earth, h is the flying height, c is the speed of light, bias is an internal Inmarsat parameter and Rsat-Perth the distance from the satellite to the relay station. We calculate R for a spherical earth model to simplify the non-Euclidean equations. Finally we make oblate projections (Wikipedia-1) to place them on the true earth. Please note that the R values do not agree with a table originally published in the blog of (Steel, 2016) and later deleted. According to our calculations those values had up to one percent error. All Doppler-shifts are classical, since it is safe to ignore relativistic contributions, atmospheric influence and gravitational shifts, which are all at least 30 times below the measurement uncertainty. We calculate the Doppler-shift from the change in the line-ofsight distance between the airplane and the satellite by differentiation of equation (3), initially ignoring the satellite earth-projection movement
where is the angle between R and the flight direction. We use h = 11 km, ignore height changes until the 7 th arc, and assume H >> RJ >> h. This flight height was chosen after optimizing the entire problem (Plougmann and Kristensen, 2004) with h fixed at 10, 11 and 12 km respectively, and finding slightly better fit for both stable solutions at 11 km (most pronounced south-easterly). In addition to the expected Doppler-shift due to the airplane velocity with respect to the satellite there is a height contribution from the satellite. It is unclear how Inmarsat handled this contribution. They split up the Doppler shift into two contributions: One entirely due to the satellite and one entirely due to the plane. Strictly speaking this is wrong since Doppler-shift is a relative effect as pointed out by (Einstein, 1905) , since the Doppler-effect depends only on the relative motion of source and receiver. One can circumvent this by choosing a suitable inertial-system as reference. However, Inmarsat has not made a well-defined choice of inertial-system. If we calculate the contribution from the satellite ground-projection movement relative to its most northern point, (not an inertial system because of earth rotation) we get agreement with their satellite contribution except for last decimal round-off and the point at 21:41 where there is a somewhat larger deviation. This issue cannot be ignored since our model is so accurate that even the last decimal matters, and the deviation at 21:41 is more than 2σ for the BFO for other routes than Inmarsat's route where everything fits. We tried to add the satellite height change, but this makes agreement worse. Therefore we have chosen to ignore the heightchange and add its maximum size linearly to the error-bar leading to a doubling of σ for the BFO. This only moves the predicted crash site a few km, so we can live with it. Under these conditions and using equation (5) the airplane Doppler shift, ∆ , is
where ν0 = 1646652500 Hz is the communication frequency (Ashton et al., 2014) , and experimental numbers including perturbation effects from satellite movement are symbolized with a tilde over the variables ( , ). We think using a detailed recipe from Inmarsat the σ enlargement can be avoided and the agreement will be better for 21:41. The published Inmarsat procedure is perfect for their specific route but potentially problematic for other routes. However, an alternative possibility is that the plane passed a thunderstorm at 21:41. Table 1 . First order perturbations from the satellite movement on R, v (along R) and for the two solutions towards 13.3˚S and 34.6˚S using values from (Ashton et al., 2014) and our own recalculations.
Satellite perturbation Solution towards 13.3˚S Solution towards 34.6˚S After calculating the values of R and Δν we take the perturbations from the satellite ground-projection movement into account. We use classical first order perturbation theory (Stewart, 1990) to find the projection on the individual R values and satellite Doppler-effect for two solutions going south and southeast in table 1. By subtracting the perturbations from the measured values we get the unperturbed result for a spherical earth in case the direction is correct. After a couple of tries we found that we only arrive at self-consistent routes with good fits in two directions. In addition we found indication of a third solution between them, but its error (χ 2 ) minimum is too shallow for a stable fit as shown in figure  3 . Starting at any other direction leads to an iterative convergence towards one of the two stable solutions. South of the shallow minimum converging to the southern solution and north of it to the south-eastern solution, both after 3-4 iterations where the satellite perturbations are recalculated for each iteration. To extract precise end-points for the solutions we used simultaneous least square curve fitting of exact analytical expressions for R and (t) derived from spherical Non-Euclidean algebra. We fitted R-and Doppler-values simultaneously to expressions for a right-angled triangle with minimum satellite distance Rmin and flight length v(t-t0) on a spherical earth for the angle in the lower end of the triangle with 1000 times less weight on the Dopplerpart of χ 2 than on the precise R-part with free parameters Rmin, v and t0. The analytical expressions in the spherical approximation without satellite movement are given by (Wikipedia-2): cos cos cos
cos cos cos cos sin sin
For continuous calculations tn is replaced by t and by . Complete expressions including perturbation from satellite movement are symbolized with a tilde over the variables ( , ). The fitting parameters for the southern and south-eastern routes are listed in table 2 together with for the R-contribution and χ 2 for the entire fit. Exclusively 21:41, 22:41, 23:14 and 00:11 were used for the fits, since only for these points we are sure of a straight flight with constant speed. χ 2 shows the best fit for the south-eastern route. This value is 3.4 times lower than for the southern route (Ashton et al., 2014) . The statistical χ 2 due to measurement uncertainty is roughly 1.5 times our best value, meaning both are within the expected uncertainty range, with the southern around the upper statistical limit. The fitted values for and ∆ are listed in table 3 where the perturbations are added back facilitating comparison with raw data. Larger deviation perhaps due to passage of a thunderstorm as the plane entered the intertropical convergence zone (Schneider et al., 2014) * ) 
Due to flame out (irrelevant for fit quality)
The last task is projecting the results on earth which is slightly oblate due to rotation. This is done using formulas for the radii of curvature in the relevant directions and for the relevant latitudes (Wikipedia-1) to convert distances to oblate geometry. Table 4 lists relevant modified R-values. After correction we manually placed the solutions on the earth surface using Google Maps (GM) by demanding that all distances and angles should fit as shown in figure 4 for the south-eastern solution. The southern solution becomes practically identical to the Inmarsat solution with a deviation on the 6 th and 7 th arcs of only 21 km and an end point at (34.591˚ South, 93.161˚ East). This means that there is no reason to refit the initial part of this solution and fine-adjust the rest, since everything will be practically identical to the findings of Ashton (2014) . For the south-eastern solution we combined the radar data at MEKAR with the handshakes at 18:28, 19:41 and 20:41, and the BFO value at 18:40 with a U-turn soon after 19:41 and a final merger with the straight route soon after 20:41 (with a small delay to match) to construct the initial part of the route. After several attempts we are convinced there is only little room for different solutions, but minor deviations (up to ±10 km) are possible. In fact many solutions in south-easterly directions can be made to follow straight lines by introducing a few minutes delay near Bandar Aceh in contrast to the conclusions by Inmarsat, but with significantly worse fitting quality than our particular solution. In addition we extrapolated the fit to 00:19:29 in the other end and found almost perfect agreement with the R-value, while the Doppler-shift deviated significantly downwards, as expected for an engine flame-out (Holland, 2017) . We choose a middle point as our best guess for the crash-position (13.279˚ South, 106.964˚ East). 
where rs = 115.748 km is the length of the linear satellite projection movement from 19:41 to 00:11, γ is the top angle at O for both triangles, φ is the angle from east at the satellite projection point at 00:11 in clockwise direction to the airplane position at the 6 th arc, a0 is the length of the back-extension of Rmin to O and a6 is the extension distance of back to O. We again use the tilde to illustrate that the satellite ground projection movement is added back on, since we are here placing the solution on earth using the true satellite projections as fix-points. Equation (9) is based on (Wikipedia-1), while we have derived (10) Equations (10) and (11) are used as independent checks of the solution (assuming negligible change in A as a function of φ near optimum), and the accuracy of the GM placing by comparing the values of φ, a0 and a6 from GM and (10) and (11). The first is done by insertion into equation (7) which is used as a non-Euclidean analogue of Pythagoras (Wikipedia-2). For the two stable solutions we find φ = 19.3˚ and φ = 51.6˚ respectively by demanding exact validity of (7) for the large triangle. The south-eastern solution agrees within 20 km with GM, while the southern solution deviates almost 200 km. The reason is that this region has large non-Euclidean modification due to rapid changes in A and relatively large oblate correction factors (see table 4). All values of a0 and a6 agree within 0.8 % with (10) and (11), except a0 in the southern solution which deviates almost 6 % (for the same non-Euclidean and oblate reasons). We have hereby performed tests of the validity and placing of our stable solutions.
4. OTHER POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS SATISFYING THE SATELLITE DATA. In order to be completely sure we find all possible solutions (candidate routes) for the model we derive formulas for identifying additional (unstable) solutions. Here larger approximations are made, so the result only allows crudely estimating 6 th arc points within 250 km along it. The radial precision is still conserved.
First order perturbation treatment of the average movement of the satellite during the flight tells us that flights directed 3˚ south (from satellite ground projection) have minimum net sensitivity to satellite movement. All other flight routes will be affected predominantly by the satellite movement perpendicular to this direction. The velocity, v0, going into the Doppler-effect is therefore given by sin 3°
This velocity will contribute to the Doppler-effect through its cosine projection along R given by cos
vsat ≈ -50 km/h near 6 th arc, meaning that the Doppler-effect is reduced for flights in southerly direction, so they need higher v to give the same Doppler-effect. The index (p) labels three different solution types: p=1: Normal speed routes: The flight joins up with the model-line after the Rmin-point at t0 (so t0 is negative) p=2: High speed routes: Near airplane performance limit, joining up before Rmin (giving positive or zero t0). As a test we independently find (due to surplus information) vV.I. = 879.9 km/h, which is close to the value used by (Iannello and Godfrey, 2016) . Because the exact starting point is unknown the largest uncertainty associated with using this simple model is the determination of . For eventual extra southern routes we chose a virtual starting point at a strategic position in the middle of the southern mouth of the Malacca Strait (west of Bandar Aceh) which all routes must (roughly) pass through. Using this we find no additional solutions within the fuel range, confirming that the solution is complete in southerly directions.
For northern directions we use MEKAR as starting point and find four optional solutions. Two are unphysical (strongly curved and/or zig-zag) routes ending in the Yunnan province of China and one leading to western Kazakhstan is outside the fuel range. The last one towards a 6 th arc crossing at (43.87˚ North, 70.06˚ East) in south-eastern Kazakhstan is almost possible, but is ruled out by impossible timing and/or flame-out before 6 th arc without unrealistically strong tail wind against the global trade winds (Schneider et al., 2014) during the first half of the route in addition to the difficulties mentioned before. The solution by Iannello and Godfrey (2016) is timely even though it includes loiter or a U-turn near Perka. However, a large speaks against it. The total χ 2 is 37.5 times higher than our best solution and 25 times above the measurement uncertainty. It also suffers from relatively poor agreement with some of the additional data. Most importantly, it balances on a mathematical knife-edge. Normally there are two such solutions as in northerly direction but this one lies at the bifurcation point where there is exactly one (double root). A location near the bifurcation leaves little room for improvement. The reason is that it uses maximum speed to match the marginal angle in this area. In conclusion, we find this type of solution an unlikely candidate for the flight route.
After effectively completing this manuscript (Iannello, 2017 ) published a more elaborate analysis which fits better. However, it displays making the deviation look smaller than and includes all points from 19:41, which lifts the bottom level for so the curve looks very flat, surprising some of the bloggers. This illustrates how essential it is to exclude 19:41 to find the south-easterly solution with the U-turn. If one includes 20:41, it is possible to find this solution but the fit is systematically poor without delay and a small direction change between 20:41 and 21:41.
INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL DATA AND INFORMATION IN THE ANALYSIS.
We use all other publically available data to choose between the two stable solutions. There are mixed opinions on the debris beaching (Iannello, 2017) , but several reports conclude it fits better the further north one gets the crash as long as it is not near the Indonesian coast. This goes for back-tracing of the flaperon from Reunion performed by Geomar in (2015) and (2016), a report from a group of oceanographers (Theguardian, 2016) and back-tracing of temporarily beached debris performed by (Chillit, 2018) . In addition nothing was found during the aerial search or the seabed search in the official search zone (including its later extension), which (in combination) effectively covered most high-probability area near the Inmarsat and Iannello solutions. Together these issues make southern routes more than an order of magnitude less probable than the south-eastern route.
Analysis of the flaperon biofouling also delivers important results (Wise, 2018). There was only one species present (tropical Goose barnacles). Furthermore Ca/Mg analysis of a large barnacle shell (Dailymail, 2016) and (ATSB, 2017) shows that it experienced an unusual thermal history with initially very high temperatures then dropping to values near its extinction limit of 18˚C and then gradually rising to values typical for Reunion. No one has been able to come up with a good explanation for this peculiar result. However, looking at sea currents and temperature world maps (Hunter, 2013) this kind of behaviour is possible when starting out near our south-eastern solution in the fall. Here a weak current of hot, nutrient-poor tropical water from north carries water towards south amplified by hurricanes (Chillit, 2018) and global warming (Feng et al., 2013) , where it meets and mixes with the relatively cool and strong Western Australian current coming from the south. The mixed current continues via Reunion to Africa under heating by tropical sunshine. Therefore debris coming from this area is settled mostly by tropical barnacles and will experience such a temperature profile when starting in March. The temperature drop is intensified and prolonged by the onset of winter. Therefore the barnacle results add roughly another order of magnitude preference for the south-eastern solution.
The only weak point of this simplified analysis is that the barnacles seem to be much too young (only a few months) judging from their size. However, one must remember that their growth-rate depends on two parameters -temperature and available nutrients. During the initial part of their life the temperature was ideal for growth, but with only small amounts of nutrients leading to a relatively slow growth. During the middle part they practically went into hibernation due to temperatures approaching their extinction limit. Finally, they drifted towards Reunion and grew increasingly rapidly. This explanation also clarifies another issue namely why some of the barnacles grew above the water line. Most likely, there were temporarily a much larger number of tropical barnacles on the flaperon weighing it down and preventing settlement of other barnacles during the winter. However, during the cooler period most of the initial barnacles died and later fell off leaving a few alive above the water line. Most likely the same happened for other debris, which explains why it was much cleaner than usual, leading some investigators to believe that the debris was planted. In case the crash had happened at the Inmarsat position the flaperon would have been gradually covered by a variety of different biofouling with origin in increasingly warmer climate-zones resulting in high biodiversity.
However the line of circumstantial evidence does not stop here where some readers may already be convinced. Depending on the finer details the official investigators estimated (Holland, 2017) that the crash starts between 00:19:29 and 00:19:37 where the plane is losing height somewhere between 15700 feet/min (fpm) and 25300 fpm indicating insignificant pilot control. The average downward speed will most likely be below the middle of this interval since a crash at 25000 fpm would probably give smaller pieces of debris than observed (Wise, 2018) . In any case an uncontrolled crash gives rise to a random horizontal walk near the end-point of the line reaching the sea surface 1-2 minutes later (Steel, 2016) . This is in excellent agreement with a sound feature recorded at the nuclear arms listening device HA01 near Cape Leeuwin (34.892˚ South, 114.153˚ East) at 00:49:42. With a water-sound-speed of 1.484 km/s expected along this passage (Steel, 2016 ) the plane should crash 114 s after 00:19:37 at our south-eastern solution to match the recording. This corresponds to a downwards speed of roughly 15000 fpm and a crash time of 1:54 min. Such a moderately rapid crash fits the average fragment size. In contrast, no sound features agree with the southern routes.
Finally the eye witness (Tee, 2014) describes a large airplane diving to low height and flying slowly west of her boat located north of Bandar Aceh at (6.628˚ North, 94.438˚ East, plus 15 km east-northeast due to later time) on the night MH370 disappeared. It came from north, made a moderate turn nearby towards her and disappeared somewhere south without landing. The plane had a red halo around it and the normal lights and windows could only be seen in the cockpit while the rest looked strange. Considering diffraction of red warning light and small windows in the cabin versus white (green) light in large cockpit windows puts the diagonal distance between her and the plane around 2.5 km. She estimates a 3-km horizontal distance. These observations agree with our southeastern solution, where the plane makes a 6.3˚ turn 17 km north of her position while diving and causing delay, and passes 2 km west of her boat. Only the time does not fit. She puts the closest approach at 19:20 while our model says 20:59. This is also essential to get spatial agreement due to the movement of her boat perpendicular to the predicted flight route. However, she was particularly uncertain about the time, so it is not an unlikely error in an area where local time-zones in India and Indonesia deviate two hours within a few km of her position.
6. DISCUSSION. For the optimum Christmas Island solution we estimate that the modelplacing-uncertainty is ±35 km along the 6 th arc. The maximum error will therefore be roughly ±70 km (2σ), which we use as the (half)-length of the search zone. For the transverse extend we propose ±15 km, since the largest contribution to this uncertainty is second-order placing error (found experimentally to be 1/6 leading to ±6 km) followed by random walk uncertainty after 00:19:37 (±3 km) and fitting uncertainty (±3 km) giving a total of ±7.5 km transverse uncertainty, and again choosing the double for the extend of the search zone. It is worth noting that all data point to positions within the central 10 % of the search zone with the largest deviation coming from Kate's observation leading to a point 4-8 km south of the centre of the zone. As a funny coincidence a 5-km shift south will perfectly align the straight flight with an end-point at Coral Bay Airport and roughly remove the 8-km offset at MEKAR (Iannello, 2017) . We therefore guess there will be a relatively high chance of finding the plane within 350 km 2 out of the 3500 km 2 . There is also something special about the Christmas Island route going through the intertropical convergence zone (Schneider et al., 2014) where satellite detection and longrange radar are hampered by tropical thunderstorms, indicating intelligent planning. Most likely the perpetrator(s) also knew about the handshakes and deliberately directed and timed the flight to get close to the worst possible mathematical data-entanglement with satellite movement through spatial correlation, making it almost impossible to find the plane because this allows for a multitude of solutions with similar fitting quality. This was achieved by flying a route resembling a magnification of the satellite ground projection curve with the SDU restarting as the plane left Malaysian radar coverage and entered this route. The U-turn was carefully aligned to match the top of the satellite projection curve, and the immediate continuation was slightly curved, followed by a straight flight to the end, pointing to perpetrator(s) with knowledge of entanglement (Wikipedia-3) and (Kristensen et al., 2012) . Interestingly, flight simulation data found near the captain's private computer (Steel, 2016) , (Iannello, 2017) and (Wise, 2018) resembles a classical analogue of a quantum Singlet-entanglement (anti-correlation) with the satellite motion while the actual route matches a Triplet-entanglement (correlation) providing optimum hiding (Kristensen et al., 2012) . However, combination of several scientific methods with topology optimization (Plougmann and Kristensen, 2004) and (Bendsøe and Sigmund, 2003) allowed discovery of the Christmas Island route and its identification as the best solution.
In case one would also go for a repeated search near the end of the southern route, the placing-uncertainty is 2.5 times larger due to non-Euclidean effects. This leads to a search zone area of 20000 km 2 which is close to the original official estimate of 25000 km 2 (ABC, 2017). However, most of it was already part of previous search zones so a much smaller area will be sufficient. To further strengthen evidence for our solution it is possible to do one of the following things: 1) Ask how the received signal strength can go up with increasing atmospheric travel distance from 20:41 to 00:11 with reference to the (Inmarsat, 2015) coverage? 2) Look for coincidence with sound recorded at Scott Reef or HA08 near Diego Garcia. Unfortunately data for the relevant times is not publically available.
If one such coincidence is found classical triangulation pinpoints the exact crash-site to a few km. However, it is the local in-coupling in the sound-guiding layer of the ocean which is most important -not the distance. Underwater mountains north of the expected crashsite may cause most coupling in southern direction and add some confusing echo. For a weak signal this potentially prevents identification.
After effectively completing this manuscript, a method was published for analysis of sound propagation in water to determine impact-distances with only one detector (Kadri et al., 2017) including application for a partial re-analysis of the data from HA01 on the night MH370 disappeared. There is a deviation of 2 minutes between their time axis and previously published data from HA01 (Steel, 2016) . If the new axis is correct, MH370 crashed exactly as the last handshake was interrupted rather than 114 s later, and the distance to the satellite projection would be roughly 11 km shorter due to smaller h, predominantly via equation (3). However we suspect there is an error in (Kadri et al., 2017) since the distance calculated for the stronger neighbouring peak seems to be off by roughly 200 km as pointed out by some bloggers (Iannello, 2017) consistent with a 2-minute error. Alternatively it is possible that the two signals accidentally coincided, which may explain the distance-discrepancy by interference.
7. CONCLUSION. In conclusion, we have used a novel combination of methods from science and engineering to disentangle and discuss all four solutions to the model of the disappearance of flight MH370. For the two stable solutions we have delivered rigorous proof of their placing and validity by using a non-Euclidean version of Pythagoras. All other publically available data point to the Christmas Island solution, while we rule out the other three. The southern route is second-best but still unlikely, and the decision to stop searching was correct (ATSB, 2017) . Resumed searching at that location makes only little sense, since the probability of finding the plane will be around 1% according to our estimates. We propose instead a new, focused search zone of 3500 km 2 centred at (13.279˚ South, 106.964˚ East) with slightly elliptical shape along the 7 th arc and a total length of 140 km and width of 30 km. The probability of finding the plane there is above 90%.
8. NOTE ADDED IN PROOF. After writing up this manuscript for submission to a peer review journal it became clear that two important but politically incorrect items are not included in the description. These could not be included in the originally submitted manuscript since they are inherently speculative. The first issue is an explanation for why the plane would dive near Bandar Aceh causing the delay. This is obviously not to hide the route, since the perpetrator(s) take a great risk (as illustrated by Kate Tee's observations) by doing it without gaining any improvement in the entanglement of the route or hiding from radar. If they just wanted to hide from Indonesian radar, it would be much better and simpler flying a small and smooth western detour. Therefore, the only plausible explanations are that they wanted to land in Bandar Aceh or abort the flight by parachute. Since the airplane did not land, the only option is parachuting. In order to do this they had to fly low and slow (as observed by Kate Tee) to open a hatch and get out. They programmed a return to normal flying-height into the autopilot before jumping. Therefore the plane returned to 11 km height after Bandar Aceh without a pressurized cabin (due to the leak through the open hatch) causing death for everybody on board who might still have been alive. In addition, the SDU would have experienced a large pressure change causing its oscillator to shift frequency. For a packaged oscillator several independent sources state that this shift will be below 5 ppb of the frequency for one atmosphere pressure change corresponding to 8 Hz for the uplink. For 11 km flying height, the shift reduces to below 5 Hz. The second issue is that even though the Doppler analysis in this manuscript correctly describes the behaviour for ΔFup (Doppler shift from aircraft to satellite) from the Inmarsat paper, it ignores compensation by the internal SDU algorithm. Inmarsat has not published any detailed information on this algorithm, so at first glance it is plausible ignoring changes in the compensation without net changes in ΔFup. However, this is an imperfect approximation, which is only justified since the BTO effect has much greater weight in the topology optimization of the route than the BFO. As an example, the end position would shift roughly +1˚ in latitude for each 1 Hz added in the BFO calculation with identical shifting of the last four points (21:41, 22:41, 23:14 and 00:11), if the BTO had zero weight in the topology optimization. With 1000 times higher weight on BTO than BFO this is obviously almost negligible for a deep, narrow BTO minimum, but still significant for a shallow local minimum as found near the Inmarsat and Iannello solutions. This tiny detail potentially compromises these two solutions, but hardly affects the preferred solution found in this manuscript.
In order to handle the SDU perturbation in case of an open hatch we tried to guess the properties of the SDU compensation algorithm. We found good agreement with published data by assuming the cosine term inside the large parenthesis in formula (6) replaced by the fixed value 1, representing positions for the nearest customers resulting in a value for the entire parenthesis of 1.15, most likely to reduce computation time. In addition, the procedure needs a fixed internal offset of 35 Hz to fit the data. By using this guess for the properties of the SDU compensation algorithm, we found the best fit to the four last BFO values for 1.8 Hz correction of the internal offset, while the earlier points need no correction (1.8 Hz messes up the other points). When working out the corrections in detail by including the impact on the internal SDU compensation from 3% speed reduction along the Christmas Island route we found net resulting BFO errors (directly comparable with our table 3) of -2 Hz, 5 Hz, 7 Hz and -10 Hz for the four points respectively. This optimum is solid and robust for four reasons:
1) It provides minimum χ 2 deviation for these four BFO values.
2) It provides zero average offset for the same four BFO values.
3) It makes the relative changes in topology χ 2 contributions for BTO and BFO compared to the Inmarsat and Iannello solutions almost identical. At present, the BTO reductions are much larger than the BFO differences. 4) It makes no significant change to our proposed end position. The only effect is a minor reduction in size for the predicted search area. , and the impact of the thunderstorm turbulence near 21:41 practically disappears (going from -18 Hz to -2 Hz). On the other hand, a pressure correction would compromise the Inmarsat, Iannello and northern solutions.
In conclusion, the consequences of these two speculative issues are in good agreement, and combined with the empty-handed search results, superior total χ
